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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ments, however, may be modified by custom. Did not the parties
enter into the formal agreement subject to the well-known practice
of banks to use such deposits in the same manner as if they were
general deposits '
The Texas court has recognized the practical import of the
situation presented here. In the cited case that court declared
that no difference in fact exists between a deposit for a specific
purpose and a general deposit. This appears to be the practical
method of handling the problem since the transaction has the ef-
fect of a general deposit. In the case of a special deposit the de-
positor is entitled to receive back the identical thing deposited and
the bank is considered a mere bailee to whom the title to the fund
does not pass.' In such a situation the recovery by means of the
trust device is satisfactory if the fund is traceable. However, in
the "specific purpose" situation a use of the trust device to create
a preference appears to be unsound because there is no wrongful
commingling.
The principal case is supported by the numerical weight of
authority but it is submitted that the minority view as set out in
the Texas case represents the sounder logic and a more common-
sense application of the law to business transactions. 7
-FREDERICK H. BARNETT.
INJUNCTIONS - AIRPORTS - NUISANCE. - Defendants were
establishing an airport, not fully developed at the time of trial,
on 272 acres of land contiguous to Cleveland, Ohio. Plaintiffs,
owners of 135 acres of adjoining land, which they used for agri-
cultural and residential purposes, applied for an injunction against
the opening of the airport, on the ground that it would be a
"'It is the custom of banks, upon receiving money for a specific purpose,
as to pay a note, to mingle the funds with their own, and to pay the note at
the proper time, just as they would a check; the funds are not kept separate.
There is no practical difference between such a deposit and a general deposit,
and it seems clear that the bank should be held to the same liability as for
a general deposit." MORSE ON BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. Voorhees,
1928) § 210.
'First State Bank of Seminole v. Shannon, 159 S. W. 398 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913). 1
'Alston v. State, 92 Ala. 124, 9 So. 732, 13 L. R. A. 659 (1891) ; McGregor
v. Battle, 128 Ga. 577, 58 S. E. 28, 13 L.. R. A. (N. S.) 185 (1907); Foster
v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 9 Am. Dec. 168 (1821); Gibson v. Erie, 196
Pa. 7, 46 Atl. 102 (1900).
See generally 1 PATON'S DiGEsT (1926) § 1789.
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nuisance, and against repeated flights over their land, on the
ground that they would be trespasses. It appeared that there
would be much annoyance to plaintiffs, from noises made by warm-
ing up, taking off, and low flying over their land, but the lower
court granted only partial relief, enjoining the raising of un-
necessary dust, the dropping of circulars, and flights over plain-
tiff's land below 500 feet.' On cross appeal the plaintiffs showed
annoyance and .discomfort already suffered, and a property de-
preciation of $65,000, whereupon the Circuit Court of Appeals en-
joined all operation of the airport, as located, as a nuisance.
Swetland v. Curtiss Airport Corp.'
The recent rapid growth of aviation has presented many
judicial problems, most of them turning on the conflict of aerial
navigation with property rights characterized broadly by the
famous Latin maxim, "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum."
Many arguments have been advanced for the freedom of the air-
space,' and considerable legislation has been drafted with the in-
tention of strengthening the rights of the aviator as against those
of the landowner.! On the other side of the question are numer-
ous decisions applying the famous maxim to trespasses committed
above the surface of the land."
Common sense makes it obvious that the landowner is not
much concerned with any theoretical right he may have to object
to, or at least to sue for, occasional high flights over his property.
Yet it is equally clear that he is vitally interested in the safe and
comfortable enjoyment of the land he owns or occupies. The lower
court in the Swetland case indicated a height at which ownership
of space becomes subject to the public right of navigation, basing
its decision on § 10 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926,' and on the
Ohio Aeronautics Act of 1929," apparently considering the ques-
tion almost entirely one of technical trespass, and in effect, ignor-
ing the rights of the adjoining landowners against unreasonable
noise and apprehension of danger. Height fixation for aerial
Swetland v. Curtiss Airport Corp., 41 F. (2d) 929 (D. C., N. D. Ohio,
1930).
255 F. (2d) 201 (C. C, A. 6th, 1932).
a Supra, n. 2, at 202, n. 1, for a reference to some of the literature on the
subject.
IFED. Am Co0mRE ACT, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 171-231 (Supp. 1931). (Note
especially § 180); UNIFORMi AERONAUTICs AcT, 9 UNiF. LAws ANN. 13-21.
'Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 90 N. W. 93 (1902); Smnith v.
Smith, 110 Mass. 302 (1872); Hoffman v. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 201 (1872).
049 U. S. C. A. § 173 (e) (Supp. 1931).
Omo GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1932) §§ 6310-38--6310-49.
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navigation is a regulatory measure, and while an unmarked, al-
most unascertainable line might furnish a workable basis for a
traffic rule, it would seem unsound when transferred from the
field of the police power and applied as a conclusive measurement
of property rights, which is the ultimate result of this decision.8
Turning to the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, we
find the first application of the nuisance theory to the flight of
aeroplanes. However, novel as that theory may appear as em-
ployed with reference to aviation, it is a theory which has been
resorted to by courts in dealing with every device in any way
comparable to an airport. Mining and manufacturing corpora-
tions and railroads have in turn been forced to adapt their methods
and equipment to the standards involved in the nuisance con-
cept.
Frequently, analogies are drawn between railroads and aerial
navigation, with a view to defeating the application of injunctive
principles to the latter. The fallacy of such analogies lies in the
attempted comparison of established railroad lines with airports.
Railroads have, by legislation, been given the right of eminent
domain. After they have exercised that right, the operation of
their lines, however offensive to the owners of adjoining prop-
erty, is not subject to injunction. The right of establishing cor-
porate airports may ultimately be derived under the same power
of condemnation, when air transportation has become a public
utility." It is to be noted, however, that the peculiar rights of
railroads do not prevent the injunction of roundhouses and
switchyards, when they are nuisances in themselves.' In the
principal case, an airport was dealt with in the same way, and ap-
parently such a method proved to be an effective safeguard for
the private rights involved, without being too great an affront to
corporate and public needs.
-JAc C. BURDETT.
8The lower court held the avigation legislation in question constitutional,
on the ground that it is merely regulatory in nature. Supre n. 1, at 938.
9 Apparently the first action of this kind ever bought on the theory of
nuisance was Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N. E. 385 (Mass. 1930).
In that case the injunction was denied because the noise, proximity, and num-
ber of aircraft were not such as to be harmful to the health and comfort of
ordinary people, and frighi and apprehension of danger or injury to live stock
or property were not present.
W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) C. 8, art. 11, § 3 makes provisions for the
condemnation of land for airports by counties, cities, towns, and villages.
u Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, 34 S. Ct. 654 (1914);
Baltimore and Potomac Railroad v. Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317, 2 S. Ct. 79
(1883); 137 U. S. 568, 11 S. Ct. 185 (1891).
3
Burdett: Injunctions--Airports--Nuisance
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1932
